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COLLABORATIVE NETWORK ACTIVITIES OF THAI 
SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS: CURRENT PRACTICES 




This article provides a systematic analysis of collaborative network activities in Thai 
subnational governance after the implementation of administrative devolution policy in 
1999. Two hundred and eighteen cases classified into three policy areas: environmental 
management and natural resource preservation, public welfare, and education and 
cultural programs, are examined regarding modes of networked collaborations, network 
sizes, and network partners and their contributions to networks. Findings show that 
networked arrangements are diverse, with the average number of partners of five, and 
are common when local governments deal with environmental management, natural 
resources and public welfare program. But it is not the case for the educational policy 
area. Also found is that civic groups are very active local partners. However, national 
and regional governmental agencies do not engage much in promoting the work of local 
partnerships. Likewise, collaboration among local governments is rare. These issues 
raise future challenges for enhancing local network collaboration and especially for 
redesigning future devolution policies. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Collaborative networks have evolved as a key strategy in public-policy making and 
implementation (Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Bardach 1998; Frederickson 1999; 
Goldsmith and Eggers 2004; Meier and O’Toole 2003; O’Toole 1996, 1997). Public 
administrators nowadays live in a networked environment, collaborating with their 
partners in order to accomplish increasingly complex tasks. So far, scholars have 
documented this phenomenon in a number of policy areas and suggest that public 
administrators take networking approaches seriously as well as devoting substantial 
efforts in dealing with these interdependent environments (Provan and Milward 1995; 
O’Toole 1996, 1997; O’Toole and Meier 1999). 
To date, very little is known about networked arrangement at the subnational government 
level in Thailand. Since the country’s implementation of comprehensive devolution 
programs in 1999, it is worth asking whether local public administration is moving 
towards more political responsiveness and democratic governance. Therefore, my 
objective is to investigate what is out there in networked public administration in Thai 
subnational governance. Empirical data will be utilized for this purpose. 
Data are obtained from research conducted during 2003-2005. Of 218 cases derived from 
field detailed surveys, they fall into three major local policy areas: Environmental 
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management and natural resource preservation, Social and public welfare, and education 
and cultural promotion. These case studies will be examined regarding modes of 
networked collaborations, partners and their contributions to networks. Case data are 
coded and subsequently analyzed to answer my research questions.  
This article is divided into the following sections. The first section presents the 
devolution context in Thailand. The second section provides the overview of recent local 
networked management. The third section delineates data and methods used in the study 
whereupon illustrative cases will be provided. Data analysis is the subject of the 
subsequent section whereby network characteristics and activities of partnerships will be 
investigated in detail. Lastly, the article analyzes key findings and policy implications 
regarding the utilization and future challenges of collaborative network management. 
 
THE DEVOLUTION CONTEXT 
Thailand is a unitary democratic state, incorporating national, regional, and local 
administration, and is governed by a parliamentary system. The executive branch of the 
central government is composed of 20 ministries, whereas regional administration is 
merely a territorial extension of the central government and has neither absolute 
autonomy nor authority over policy making and administration. By contrast, local 
governments are self-governing bodies. Presently, there are about eight thousand units of 
local governments. 
The country has implemented a comprehensive devolution policy since 1999 under the 
promulgation of the Decentralization Plan and Process Act of 1999. Basically, 
decentralization policy was a part of the country’s administrative and political reforms 
since the military coup in May 1992 (UNDP 2003). Failures in country management in 
the past led to the realization that a centralized public administration was one of the 
major causes of the country’s political and economic instability. Public sentiment has 
thus called for decentralized administration, devolving fiscal resources and 
responsibilities of peripheral public services into the hands of local governments, as a 
means to promote a smaller and more transparent national government, and to promote 
local democratic governance. 
The Decentralization Plan and Process Act of 1999 stipulated that some services that 
were originally the responsibility of national governments should be devolved into the 
hands of local governments
1
. These services are, for example, local and community 
planning and development; promotion of local economic development, investment, 
employment, trade, and tourism; local public services provision, including local roads, 
local public transportation system, public markets, ports and docks, waste treatment, 
water drainage system, local public utilities, parks and recreation, garbage collection, pet 
controls, slaughtering, community public safety, preservation of community natural 
resources and environmental protection, communal disaster control, sanitation and 
cremation services; and social welfare services provision, including primary and 
secondary education, social welfare for children and for the elderly and disabilities in 
community, primary health care and medical services, housing and restoration, 
community arts and cultures. 
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In tandem with devolved service responsibilities, the central government also devolved a 
greater degree of fiscal autonomy (including human resource management) to local 
governments. Basically, local revenues come from four major sources, (1) locally 
collected revenues (taxes, fees, charges, permits, fines, etc.), (2) local revenues collected 
by central government agencies (VAT, excises, vehicle, land registration, and etc.), (3) 
revenue sharing, and (4) grants. Of these totals, grants and local taxes collected by central 
agencies as well as revenue sharing constitute 58.2% and 20.5%, respectively; while 
locally collected amount is 21.3% in fiscal year 2005 (Ministry of Finance, Thailand). 
Intergovernmental grants and transfers are often allocated on an equal basis and ignore 
local fiscal capacity
2
. Additionally, local authorities have access to bond issuing and debt 
financing. However, they are under the stringent control of the Ministry of Interior and 
the cabinet’s approval. 
Accountability systems have been institutionalized to ensure the interest of local 
residents. Local residents have the rights to recall votes and to throw out of office elected 
local officials deemed irresponsive or dishonest. Transparency in local administration and 
civic participation are now legally legitimate. Legal frameworks stipulate civic 
participations in local planning and budgeting, the dissemination of information by local 
authority, the audit of local financial and performance reports by external auditors 
(Auditor General and Ministry of Interior), and civic involvement in procurements and 
monitoring the exercise of state power. 
To date the devolution progress is growing, but somewhat slow according to the 
decentralization law. While significant transfers of service functions have occurred in 
infrastructure, natural resources and environmental management, and quality of life, the 
devolutions of health care and educational services have not yet been taken place. Civil 
servants in the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Education are reluctant to 
transfer to local authorities (Bowornwathana 2006; Nelson 2002; Smoke 2005), mainly, 
as they believe, due to the fear of career advancement and fringe benefits and due to the 
lack of confidence in the capability of local governments to assume the services (Nelson 
2002). 
The effectiveness of accountability control was limited due to the inadequacy of auditing 
all local authorities, the continuing uses of traditional budgeting and accounting practices 
(line-item budgeting and cash-basis accounting procedures), and the ineffective use of 
performance management system. As a result, the general public hardly knows whether 
local expenditures meet their promises or whether program objectives have been 
materialized. In addition, civic participation, though blossomed in the past few years, still 
was less intense by western standards and often concentrated within small residential 
groups (Smoke 2005; Suwanmala 2007; White and Smoke 2005). 
 
MANAGING NETWORKS IN THAI LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
Fundamentally, local governments are incorporated by the principle of self-governing. 
Each local government consists of the executive body and the local council, each of 
which is headed by locally elected persons from local residents and serves a four-year 
term. The elected executive, so-called mayor for municipality (1,276 units) or chairman 
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for Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO, 75 units) and for Tambon (subdistrict) 
Administrative Organization (TAO, 6,500 units)
3
, is the top political head of local 
executive bodies and is held accountable to local council and to residents. He or she is 
also responsible for preparing local development policies and annual budgets which will 
be scrutinized and officially adopted by the council. These three types of general forms of 




As a result of close proximity to local constituencies, policy formulation and 
implementation of Thai local governments usually is pursued through networks. 
Networked management occurs in various policy areas and incorporates diverse partners; 
for instance; regional branch offices of national government agencies, local occupational 
groups, non-profit organizations, local business units, community volunteered groups, 
and international development organizations. Simultaneously, civic participation in local 
public affairs has blossomed gradually since the wide-scale democratic reform after the 
military coup in 1992 (UNDP 2003). Several success stories exhibit this fact (Kokpon 
2003; Krueathep 2004; Suwanmala 2007), including case studies to be explored in this 
article, although the magnitude of civic participation is still limited by the western 
standard (White and Smoke 2005; Smoke 2005). 
The reason for local networks is mainly due to institutional limitations of local 
government units. As commonly known, the majority of Thai local governments, 
particularly TAOs
5
, possess very limited organizational capacities both in terms of human 
and financial resources as well as the degree of knowledge accumulation 
(Bowornwathana 2006; Green 2005). Therefore, the collaborative approach is an 
attractive method for many local administrators in order to mitigate these institutional 
constraints. 
Moreover, the devolution movement has pushed forward public participation as a means 
to monitor local government performance and to hold them accountable to local 
constituency (Suwanmala 2004, 2007; UNDP 2003; White and Smoke 2005). Thai 
scholars and practitioners alike have advocated participatory approaches in order that 
local residents can express their views and defend their rights to give their voices to local 
public-policy making and implementation. Nowadays, people and local advocacy groups 
have the right to be involved in developing local policies, making decisions on critical 
issues, providing views and information regarding local development plans and budgets, 
and inspecting the exercise of local government power. These have laid the foundation 
for more accessible and accountable local government. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This article examines 218 cases of the management of local programs in Thailand, most 
of which have been pursued through collaborative networks. These case studies are 
selected from a pool of 529 good-practice cases, obtained from the “Thailand’s Local 
Government Initiatives Research Project,” carried out during 2003-2005, and covering 
wide geographical (North, Northeast, Central, and South) as well as local policy areas. 
The project was financially supported by Thailand Research Fund (TRF). 
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The main purpose of this research is to evaluate administrative adjustments of local 
governments after the 1999 devolution. We aimed to collect in-depth good-practice cases 
of local programs that were initiated after or as a result of the 1999 national 
decentralization movement
6
. The majority of our cases (about 79.6 percent) took place 
between 2001 and 2003. Our research goal was to collect cases with rich detailed 
information on what programs were implemented, why and how they were implemented, 
who was involved in policy formation and implementation processes, what kind of 
resources were utilized, and what the program results were. The final cases went through 
several data collection and validation processes. 
First, we conducted a mail survey from a list of localities to acquire preliminary data in 
order to ascertain if they have initiated new administrative arrangements that have the 
potential to develop as a case study. The survey covered all 75 provinces, except 
Bangkok, which was carried out during June to August 2003. Then, short telephone 
conversations (about 15-30 minutes) were made from the survey responses to ensure that 
the short-listed cases met our research purposes. 
Next, field researchers visited local government sites to complete in-depth interviews 
with local politicians, administrators and city residents in order to acquire detailed 
information about the origins, strategic implementations, obstacles and results of each 
case. Researchers also examined relevant documents such as official budgets, memoranda 
of management and community meetings, case evaluations, annual reports, newsletters, 
or photographs. All cases were collected by using a uniformed data collection sheet and 
field researchers were required to participate in a two day workshop before starting the 
data collection processes. Each case usually takes two man-days to complete the form. 
This phase took place during September 2003 and April 2005. 
The compiled data from the fields were then reported to and re-examined by our 
investigator teams. After checking for their completeness, the potential cases were sent 
back to respective local administrators to have them rechecked and validated. The 
investigators screened out deficient cases and eventually developed 529 full cases. This 
step took place concurrently from January 2004 to June 2005.   
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Study Sample 
In this article networked activities are examined from the case data specifically in three 
major local policy areas: (i) environmental management and natural resource 
preservation, (ii) social services and public welfare, and (iii) education and cultural 
promotion. These three policies are selected since, in Thailand and other countries alike, 
they constitute a large portion of local government’s responsibilities. Understanding in 
these policy areas is beneficial to the overall betterment of local administration. Case data 
are originally in a text format and are carefully coded into numerical values in order to 
obtain key variables as suggested by my research questions. Table 1 summarizes the 
overview of these cases. 
 
Table 1: Overview of Case Studies 
Policy/Program areas Number of 
Cases 
Percentage 
Environment and Natural resource conservation 84 38.53 
- Environmental management 8 3.67 
- Forest preservation 18 8.26 
- Water resources preservation 14 6.42 
- Garbage and waste disposal 44 20.18 
Social and public welfare 79 36.24 
- Health care 20 9.17 
- Social welfare 18 8.26 
- Quality of life 18 8.26 
- Anti-drug programs 23 10.55 
Education and Cultural promotion 55 25.23 
- Education 32 14.68 
- Cultural promotion 23 10.55 
Total 218 100.00 
 
Source: Author, 2008. 
 
The approach in this article is first to analyze key typologies of networked management 
in Thai local governments. Then, major collaborative activities will be examined in 
detail. This will help us understand who the local partners are and what contributions 
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Four Illustrative Cases 
Yala Municipality: Partnerships in Promoting Interactive Student Learning. Yala 
municipality is a central city located in the far south with a population of about 76,500 in 
2003. The city administers six municipal schools with the total number of primary-school 
students being approximately 1,700
7
. In 1999, National Parliament promulgated the 
National Education Act of 1999, which refocused pedagogical approaches from teacher-
based and classroom orientation to student-based and flexible learning styles in order that 
children are able to develop mentally, physically, and socially. 
City administrators initially grasped the idea of promoting student-based learning but still 
lacked a definite, tangible plan. After a series of consultations with two non-profit 
organizations, one for-profit organization, and teacher and parent associations, the city’s 
idea was eventually materialized in late 1999. The initiative combines edutainment 
approaches with the development of new interactive learning facilities; namely the 
Exploring Park and Exploring Center (see Figure 1 and 2), aiming at stimulating a child’s 
learning from a variety of play-and-learn activities. 
 
Figure 1: Exploring Park (Landscape view) 
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Exploring Center is an in-door learning facility for 11 different skills. Attending the 
center is a part of the school curriculum, incorporating a one-hour-per-week learning 
package. Exploring Park, on the other hand, is an out-door facility, consisting of seven 
exploring zones. The Park is open publicly for students and the general public. After all, 
this collaboration seems to provide satisfying results. The data of facility usages in 2001 
indicates three to four thousand usages per month for the Exploring Park and about six to 
eight hundred usages per month for the Exploring Center. Additionally, satisfaction 
surveys revealed that more than 90 percent of students and teachers were highly satisfied 
with the facilities and interactive learning programs, and more than 60 percent of parents 
were very satisfied since they observed positive changes in children’s behavior towards 
learning and going to school. 
 
Figure 2: Exploring Park (Tower zone) 
 
Source: Author, 2008. 
 
Pluak-Dang TAO: Contracting out Primary Health Services. Pluak-Dang City is a small, 
rural-based society, with a population of approximately 5,600, and located in Rayong 
Province, the eastern part of the country. The majority of the population is relatively poor 
and performs agricultural and farm work for a living. They have neither basic health 
insurance nor receive basic health services from their government
8
. Unfortunately, due to 
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the total local personnel of 13 persons in the government, the city does not operate its 
own hospital nor directly provide primary healthcare. 
This service deficiency has raised concerns for city administrators and local residents for 
several years. In February 2002, a year after the devolution programs became effective; 
the city mayor initiated a policy to have private contractors provide primary health 
services for local residents. The policy was submitted to the local council and to a public 
hearing in the city’s civic meeting. Eventually, the proposed plan and operating budgets 
were approved three months later. The city then contracted with a private hospital in a 
nearby city to have two physicians and six nurses provide regular primary health services 
and biannual check-ups in designated community areas, free of charge to communal 
residents. In sum, this sort of partnership assists the city in expanding its service coverage 
to those in need and increases citizen satisfaction towards city government. 
Kud-Namsai TAO: Community-based Measures for Watershed Protection Kud-Namsai 
city, located in Khon-Khan province with a population of about 7,000, is surrounded by 
fertile Nampong water sources. A majority of the population (about 80 percent) subsist 
on small fishing and agriculture. Thus, water sources are a major source of water supply 
and economic lifeblood to the community. Unfortunately, the encroachment of large 
factories to Kud-Namsai since late 1980s (electrical power generation and paper 
production industry) has caused serious water pollution to the community. Residents 
often find illegal dumping of hazardous waste into community waterways, where major 
hazards were observed in March 1992 and May 1993. However, they were not able to 
identify the origin of the waste disposal due to its non-observable chemical attributes. 
At first, the residents responded by informing the factories to stop dumping industrial 
waste into the community waterways. They also reported the situation to government 
officials at the Department of Industrial Control, the Ministry of Industry, the Regional 
Office of the Environment Protection Department (REPD), and the Ministry of Science, 
Technology, and Environment. However, officials reacted feebly to the problem. They 
set up a small working group and monitored the quality of Nampong watersheds for only 
three months. Essentially, there was no punitive legal measure ever issued to the factories 
since no evidence of chemical hazard surfaced during the short monitoring period. Put 
differently, this action deterred the problem, but did not warrant the cease of hazardous 
waste disposal in the future. Things became worse in December 1997 when major waste 
disposal evidently caused the deaths of thousands of fish and aquatic lives. In effect, 
angry mobs and local media gathered outside the plants and blamed the plant 
management teams for irresponsible actions. 
In effect, a collaborative working group was formed, with strong supports from the TAO, 
local environmental NGOs, local universities, World Health Organization (WHO), the 
REPD, and plant representatives who agreed to join and support the community in 
solving the problem. Initially, about 50 local residents volunteered to regularly monitor 
water quality in their neighborhood. They were intensively trained in the methods of 
scientific tests of water quality (e.g. Biochemical Oxygen Demand: BOD and Chemical 
Oxygen Demand: COD, Acid-Base (pH) test, etc.) and were provided with standard 
testing equipment, all supported for by the partners. 
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The volunteer group is divided into four sub-units, testing the samples of water from 15 
predetermined locations throughout community waterways. The water sampling and 
quality testing is conducted once a month and will be increased up to three times a month 
during the rainy season (normally June - October). Water-quality testing data are then 
analyzed against scientifically accepted standards and reported to all parties concerned, 
including the plant operators and local residents. In addition, the city government 
established the Community Environment Information Center in early 1998 and has 
provided financial and logistical support for the work of the volunteer group. 
Because of scientifically-based data, the reports are highly regarded as a good indication 
of community water-quality. They have a strong deterrent effect. No acute dumping of 
hazardous waste has been detected since 1998. This community-based action of water-
quality monitoring initiative proves how the potential of collaboration and scientific 
knowledge can be transferred among network partners for the betterment of communal 
lives. 
Nasang TAO: Community Measures for Anti-drug Abuses and Trafficking. Nasang TAO 
is a small local government (with five permanent staff in total) and is located in a small 
rural-based community in Lampang province, in northern Thailand, with a population of 
about 5,100. Basically, a primary relationship is dominant in the community. Social 
norms, both implicitly and explicitly established, have proven to be effective in 
enhancing social coherence in many circumstances. 
In 1999, the problems of drug abuse and trafficking were found to be a problem with a 
number of juveniles in Nasang community. The Mayor of Nasang TAO took initial action 
by forming a small coalition group, consisting of TAO administrators and councilmen, 
village heads, and officials from regional government offices. They jointly assessed the 
magnitude of drug problems in the community, as well as foreseeable consequences if no 
action were taken.  After realizing the seriousness of the problems, they all agreed that 
these issues should be addressed in the community’s civic forum so that residents would 
be aware of them and that the problems would be thoroughly prevented.  
The reason that the drug problems were addressed publicly depended largely on 
community relationships. Given the primacy of strong social norms in guiding individual 
behaviors in Nasang community, any corrective measures that are collectively structured 
will be followed strictly by individuals and reinforced through the manifold webs of city-
village-household-individual relationships. 
Essentially, the forum agreed to use soft corrective actions (community rules), rather than 
enforcing tough legal measures in the fight against drugs. First, they adopted a series of 
community rules, stipulating that: (1) first time drug users will be notified to cease using 
drugs. If they remain involved, then a second degree of public response is further 
enforced. For those Welfare benefits provided to individuals who are involved in drugs, it 
should be noted that the benefits will be suspended and drug users will be disassociated 
from community activities; (2) in the case of drug trafficking: the community will 
immediately sanction drug dealers from all kinds of services and welfare benefits 
received from the community. No interpersonal relationships with other community 
members will be allowed. When individuals completely sustain from drugs activities, 
then community relationships and welfare benefits will be resumed.  
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To this extent, the village heads and civic leaders from all neighborhoods worked 
collaboratively with the city officials and police to keep community residents under close 
surveillance regarding drug activities. In addition to social enforcement measures, the 
community also agreed to provide job opportunities and occupational training programs 
as incentives to assist addicts stay free from drug-related activities.  
All these social measures proved effective in eradicating community drug problems. Prior 
to the use of social control measures, approximately 32 people were identified that were 
involved in drugs and were put under close community surveillance. After a year of 




A Typology of Networked Collaboration 
Our cases studies reflect some major characteristics of collaboration. Specifically, the 
collaborative activities exhibit differences across two dimensions: (1) the degree of 
sharing of information, resources, and responsibility and (2) the degree of civic 
involvement in local public affairs. Given these two characteristics, four distinct types of 
networked management of Thai local governments are developed as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: A Typology of Network Strategic Choices 
 
 
Source: Author, 2008 
 
I. Traditional Bureaucratic Model: In this type, local government is an alone “doer” of 
service responsibilities. Civic involvement with localities and resource sharing are nil. 
Neither citizens nor civic organizations gain access to local agenda setting. Information is 
concentrated within the bureaucracy and service responsibilities are solely of the 
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authoritative-type doers. This group of local governments needs very little dependence on 
external resources or expertise. Note that none of our four illustrative cases belongs to 
this traditional administrative mode. 
II. Consultative Model: In this model, local government still takes the lead in solving 
community problems or policy issues. Yet it is a bit more open to external ideas and 
information. Local administrators usually consult with partners when they need. 
However, the sole decision making authority is still situated in local bureaucracy. Only 
limited pieces of information or public participation is allowed when local policy 
windows are intermittently unlocked. In addition, this sort of partnerships does not last 
very long. The consultative process is usually disbanded when the emerging problem has 
been solved. The case of Yala Municipality falls into this type. 
III. Contracted Model: This model is somewhat similar to the traditional public-private-
partnership model, where the delivery of local public services is performed by 
contracting business sectors. The case of Pluak-Dang City exhibits this arrangement. 
Relationships between government and private sectors are somewhat formal and are 
regulated by explicit contract or agreement. The ultimate responsibility is shared between 
the contracted government and the contracting private organizations. These private 
sectors usually have management and resource autonomy, as well as financial obligations 
if their operations were unsuccessful, within a specified framework from the government. 
Information about service performance is often shared such that administrators can 
effectively monitor service performances of their private counterparts. Note, however, that 
civic involvement in this mode of local governance is still limited, mostly as passive 
service recipients. 
IV. Decentralized Model: Local government in this type encourages a wide civic 
participation in local service deliveries. Citizens engage proactively and meaningfully in 
shaping the direction of local development with public administrators. Nonetheless, due 
to the nature of tasks, local government often facilitates local communities to take the 
lead in performing most of the tasks. Local authority may provide some form of financial 
or technical assistance to the operations of these civic associations. In effect, this 
“mediator/facilitator” government-type provides a great deal of implementation 
flexibility into the hands of communities. Communication and information sharing 
between local administrators and civic organizations are less frequent and mainly 
concentrated at the communal levels. Therefore, local administrators neither have 
complete information nor control over the communal groups. The volunteered group in 
monitoring water quality in Kud-Namsai City reveals this networked relationship. 
V. Collaborative Model: In this type, several partners join local-affairs venue with 
dispersed missions. Local administrators are not dominant in network but just one among 
multiple players. Their key role is to be an “integrator” who forcefully drives the 
networks and skillfully balances the differences among distinct players. In this model, a 
sharing of information, expertise, and resources is common. The bottom-up participation 
from civic communities is also necessary to reap the benefits of citizen feedback on 
complex tasks. Success or failure depends largely on individual partner contributions to 
the network. Without any joint-action arrangement, the tasks can never be realized by the 
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action of any independent partners. Nasang’s community measures for drug abuse 
represent this collaborative model. 
 
Analysis of Network Activities 
This section describes the major collaborative activities of Thai local governments in 
detail. First, I elaborate an overview of collaborations across policy areas. Then, it 
examines the average size of networks, the composition of local government’s partners, 
and the partners’ contributions in networking activities. Table 2 exhibits the number of 
each type of networked collaboration for 218 cases, classified by three policy areas. 
 
Table 2: Modes of Networked Collaborations Classified by Policy Areas 










Count 8 15 16 39  
% 9.5% 19.0% 29.1% 17.9%  
Consultative Model Count 12 18 17 47  
% 14.3% 22.8% 30.9% 21.6%  
Contracted Model Count 7 4  11  
% 8.3% 5.1%  5.0%  
Decentralized Model Count 43 32 14 89  
% 51.2% 40.5% 25.5% 40.8%  
Collaborative Model Count 14 10 8 32  
% 16.7% 12.7% 14.5% 14.7%  
Total Count 84 79 55 218  
% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  
 
Note: For this table, Chi-square is 21.9 and Cramer’s V is .224, p-value < .01 
Source: Author, 2008. 
 
At a glance, what this frequency table tells us is that the emergence of networked 
approaches in Thai local administration is very promising. The majority of local 
governments (about 82.1 percent) have adopted some form of collaborations when they 
implemented public programs. Of this figure, about 89 cases (or 40.8 percent) chose to 
decentralize service responsibilities to their civic counterparts. This conforms with my 
discussion above that several Thai local governments are relatively weak and, thus, prone 
to facilitate local community groups to bear service responsibilities. 
Devolution policy may, in part, account for this positive trend. Local authorities have 
been allowed for greater administrative autonomy. At the same time, they have been 
overwhelmed with increasing service responsibilities. These push and pull factors may 
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force local administrators to seek partners as new administrative strategies, instead of 
performing all tasks alone, in order to ease their burdens. 
What is intriguing from Table 2 is the pattern of networking across policy areas. 
Consider environmental management and natural resource preservation first. We can 
observe that more than half (about 68 percent) of local governments of this policy 
category chose either the Decentralized or Collaborative Forms. The same is also true for 
social and public welfare programs (about 53 percent). By contrast, collaborations in 
educational and cultural promotion programs are relatively restricted. The majority of 
local administrators (60 percent) prefer to carry out educational programs through their 
own effort or, at most, consulting intermittently with their outside partners.  
Ironically, this is a warning sign for Thai local administrators in formulating and 
implementing educational or culture related programs. In many well developed societies, 
scholars and practitioners alike contend that higher educational achievements will be 
realized when local communities get involved in schooling (Bardach 1998; Hannaway 
1993; OECD 1989; Meier and O’Toole, 2001; Smith and Wohlstetter, 2006; UNESCO, 
2001; Weiler 1993). Partnerships in schooling may help schools increase service quality 
and educational outcomes by offering access to additional resources and the transfer of 
knowledge and expertise (Smith and Wohlstetter, 2006). 
Therefore, partnership in local education and cultural program provision is a major 
challenge for Thai localities in the immediate future. As already discussed, the devolution 
of educational services in Thailand has not progressed much due partly to, as widely 
argued by school teachers and parents, the lack of adequate ability of localities to carry 
out educational tasks (Nelson, 2002). In this regard, education network might be an 
alternative way to develop the readiness of localities to effectively handle the devolved 
educational functions.  
Now, one may ask how large the network partnerships are. One way to assess the size of 
networks is to examine the aggregate number of partners in networks (Graddy and Chen 
2006). A general picture of the number of local partners is exhibited in Table 3. Of our 
218 cases, the number of network partners ranges from zero (which means no partner at 
all) to 145 with the average of about 5 (median value). The majority of local governments 
(about 55.5 percent) have one to five partners. This average network size of five is 
somewhat similar to the finding of Graddy and Chen (2006), who found that the average 
size of network in social service delivery in Los Angeles County is about five. Note, 
however, that this comparison is only suggestive. Indeed, they are by no means 
comparable due to differences across administrative and civic cultures. 
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Table 3: Number of Network Partners 










None 7 (3.2) 2 3 2 
1-5 121 (55.5) 39 41 41 
6-10 38 (17.4) 16 14 8 
11-20 32 (14.7) 17 14 1 
20-50 16 (7.3) 7 7 2 
> 51 4 (1.8) 3 0 1 
Total 218 (100.0) 84 79 55 
     
Means 8.95 12.14** 7.84** 5.69** 
Median 5 6 5 3 
S.D. 14.77 20.12 7.53 11.99 
Min. 0 0 0 0 
Max. 145 145 36 85 
 
Note: ANOVA test for means difference between three policy areas is F = 3.613 and 
significant at 5% (p-value = .029) 
Source: Author, 2008. 
 
Observe further that the network sizes differ significantly across three policy areas, where 
the networks in environmental management and resource conservation have the largest 
size of about six partners (median value). This is understandable, since by the nature and 
scope of the problems the successful implementation of natural resource conservation and 
environmental policies require very intense collective efforts from all stakeholders 
(Scheberle 2004).  
On the contrary, the size of educational networks is relatively small. Local administrators 
seem to be less aggressive in forging partnerships when they implement educational or 
cultural promotion programs. On average, the network size in this policy area consists of 
approximately three partners. This finding is congruent with that of Table 2 discussed 
above and needs no further discussion here. 
The next question is who are the partners of these collaborations? To answer this, the 
composition of partners is classified into nine categories. The summary of these partners 
is delineated in Table 4 below. Here it is evident that locally formed groups are very 
actively engaged in local administration. About 81 percent of local governments in the 
study indicate that community groups joined their local networks. Likewise, regional 
branch offices of central government agencies involved acutely in helping local 
administrators complete their tasks (about 75 percent of our cases). Local residents in 
general also participated in community networks, yet to a lesser degree (about 61 percent 
of local jurisdictions). These three partners were engaged frequently in environmental 
and natural resource conservation policies as well as public and social welfare programs. 
It is somewhat embarrassing that the collaborations between local authorities are limited. 
Only five percent of local governments worked together in order to accomplish their 
tasks. This finding raises serious concerns that Thai local governments have not yet 
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satisfactorily reaped the benefits of service co-production/provisions as suggested by the 
network literature. Why they barely collaborated with each other is another research 
question which is beyond this study, yet deserves further investigation. What I may 
suggest thus far is that central government policies or incentives may be in needed in 
order to stimulate better collaboration among local agencies
9
. 
Note, however, that the above table has not yet provided a clear picture of detailed 
activities in which the network partners contributed to the networks. This is the topic of 
subsequent discussions. Table 5 helps extend our investigation. Basically, what the table 
shows are the characteristics of partners’ involvement in collaborative processes: (i) 
policy or strategic decision-making, (ii) implementation, and (iii) resource exchanges. I 
classified them based on whether partners involved in decision-making processes acted 
actively or passively, whether they engaged in implementing the policy/program 
throughout the entire steps, and what resources (financial, physical, or technical-
information) they contributed to the networks. 
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Table 4: Exhibit of Local Government Partners 
Partners 
Number  
(% of total 
number of 




















35 (16.1) 20 (23.8) 9 (11.4) 6 (10.9) 6.103 .167 
Regional office of 
central government 
164 (75.2) 66 (78.6) 61 (77.2) 37 (67.3) 2.54 .108 
Local community / 
Volunteered groups 
176 (80.7) 72 (85.7) 66 (83.5) 38 (69.1) 6.534 .173 
International deve-
lopment orgs. a/ 
13 (6.0) 12 (14.3)  1 (1.8)   
NGOs or Religious 
organizations 
47 (21.6) 23 (27.4) 9 (11.4) 15 (27.3) 7.574 .186 
Local residents 132 (60.6) 66 (78.6) 48 (60.8) 18 (32.7) 29.246 .366 
Academic institutes / 
Professional orgs.  
34 (15.6) 16 (19.0) 4 (5.1) 14 (25.5) 11.479 .229 
Other local 
governments a/ 
10 (4.6) 6 (7.1) 3 (3.8) 1 (1.8)   
Local business sectors 46 (21.1) 37 (44.0) 6 (7.6) 3 (5.5) 43.331 .446 




 the expected count is less than 5, therefore, no chi-square or Cramer’s V is 
reported. Chi-square and Cramer’s V indicate relationships between the involvements of 
each partner in each policy area. The high relationship indicates that partners are more 
interested in some policy areas than the others. 
Source: Author, 2008. 
Table 5 below reveals very intriguing facts. Although regional branch offices of central 
government agencies are key partners in local networks, they do reactively engage in 
networked activities. Most of the time, they engaged in local collaboration by merely 
providing technical assistance or consultations, and then step back, despite the fact that 
they possess very qualified personnel. On the contrary, local community groups are ‘true 
partners’ of local networks who often undertake tasks seriously. They engaged in 
decision-making processes and helped local staff implement the collaborative programs 
very thoroughly. This finding signifies the importance of future direction of the 
devolution policy. 
In Thailand, there has been a great deal of debate concerning the pros and cons of 
administrative devolutions and local government autonomy (Bowornwathana 2006; 
Smoke 2005; Taliercio 2005). As our analysis has shown, it is worth inquiring: Would it 
be more appropriate if some, if not all, central government staffs who are working in 
local or regional branch offices were transferred to local authorities? This question 
concerns the issue of strengthening local government capabilities, reducing 
administrative redundancy, transaction costs and enhancing local political 
responsiveness. This challenge clearly deserves future researches regarding whether the 
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transfer of personnel to local authorities is more beneficial to local governance than the 
current practice. 








A B C D E F G 
National government agencies 9 1  6 24 3 4 
Regional office of central government 
agencies 
78 32 48 105 7 28 91 
Local community groups/ Volunteered 
group 
46 109 143 29 2 1 10 
International development organization 8 2 1 10 8  5 
NGOs / Religious organizations 20 10 14 24 5 8 20 
Local residents 51 58 43 66 15 1  
Academic institutes / Professional 
organizations 
13 3 10 16 1  29 
Other local governments 2 5 3 3 3 2  
Local business sectors 14 5 16 19 11 1 9 
Total 218 218 218 
 
Notes: 
A = Assisted/consultative in policy decision-making processes 
B = Engaged actively in policy/strategy decision-making 
C = Engaged thoroughly the entire implementation processes 
D = Assisted haphazardly during program implementation 
E = Financial resource supports 
F = Physical resource supports 
G = Technical/expertise/information exchange 
Source: Author, 2008. 
 
 
It should be noted that the classifications of the partners’ contributions to networks along 
with the three policy areas yield somewhat similar results to Table 5 above, except those 
of the educational and cultural programs which are still in a limited degree of 
collaborations as already discussed. 
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CONCLUSIONS: RESULTS AND NETWORKING 
This article provides a systematic analysis to collaborative networking activities in Thai 
subnational governance. It began by elaborating Thai devolution context for the 
formation of networks. Then, it analyzes the nature and elements of networked activities 
which have occurred in Thai local administration. What we can deduce for now is that 
networked collaboration in Thai subnational government is very hopeful. The devolution 
programs somehow stimulated local political responsiveness and more collaborative-style 
local governments. 
Networked arrangements are diverse regarding the nature of emerging issues. Generally, 
local authorities often form the network, with five partners on average, to help 
accomplish their public purposes. Networked approaches are usually adopted when 
governmental reaches are limited or when stand-alone actors are incapable of solving 
problems, as is the case with natural resource preservation, environmental management, 
and public and social welfare. Collaborations are formed to help enhance policy/program 
achievement. 
By contrast, the analysis shows that in the case of educational and cultural programs in 
Thai local administration, collaborations are still restricted. In many developed countries, 
analysts contend that higher educational outcomes can be achieved when local 
communities get involved in schooling since partnerships help schools gain access to 
additional resources and information (Bardach 1998; Hannaway 1993; OECD 1989; 
Meier and O’Toole 2001; Smith and Wohlstetter 2006; UNESCO 2001; Weiler 1993). 
Therefore, if we believe that collaboration will increase a programs success, it is the 
future challenge of Thai localities to promote more collaborative approaches in this 
policy area. Future research on this area may be needed to provide more evidence of the 
benefits from local educational networks, especially from the developing countries’ 
experiences like Thailand.  
Networking approaches are not beyond governmental reaches. This research provides 
good evidence for many other developing countries and well-developed societies alike in 
that partnerships are feasible and desirable. This research also shows empirically that 
local community groups do exist or can be easily formed to support collective 
governmental works. Somehow, countries with societal and cultural factors like those of 
Thailand may replicate these administrative trends. What is required is the mobilization 
of partnerships in which local administrators need to push forward. 
In the meantime, the major challenge remains with the collaborations among local 
authorities. Unlike the experiences of other developed nation, this study reveals the fact 
that the past collaborations among Thai localities were shortcoming. Thai devolution 
programs, hence, failed in this point. Still, there are great opportunities for local 
governments to reap more fruitful benefits from joint service production/ provisions in 
the future, particularly when the collaborations may efficiently cope with the potential 
problems of externalities (as in the case of environment and natural resources) or the 
economy of scale (as the case of public education). Central policies to promote more 
partnerships among cities through either conditional intergovernmental grants or other 
means of rewards might be useful. Alternatively, agendas for future research in this 
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regard may focus on why and when city governments do or do not collaborate with one 
another. 
Considering at a broader perspective toward administrative devolution in Thailand, this 
initial evaluation reveals the positive results of the devolution on local governance. Local 
governments are now more accessible and cooperative, signifying that they have become 
more responsive to external partners. Notwithstanding, the devolution of central 
personnel to local authorities is on the way. Very few higher-level staff is willing to be 
transferred to local governments (Green 2005; Smoke 2005). This research shows that the 
officials in local and regional branches of national government agencies are very capable 
of helping to solve local problems. Yet, thus far, they have failed to engage themselves 
intensely in local affairs.  
Arguably, they are not local officials and, by administrative designs, need not be 
accountable to local constituents. Notwithstanding, there is no obvious benefit of having 
these local and regional branch offices of central agencies. Indeed, this causes 
administrative redundancies and less responsiveness in a local governance system. The 
relocations of these regional staffs may more or less improve overall local democratic 
accountability, which is one of the core element of successive devolution programs 
(Green 2005).  
The devolution policy implemented thus far should lead to the reconsideration of existing 
Thai public administration design. Many developing countries have pushed forward 
radical administrative reform (so-called ‘Big-Bang’ in, for example, Indonesia and the 
Philippines) while Thailand has followed the path of gradual changes (White and Smoke 
2005; Smoke 2005). This research suggests that it is about the time for rethinking the 
future of devolution programs. Priorities may include the transfer of the groups of central 
personnel to respective localities. The benefits of doing so, if any, would belong to local 
communities as a whole. 
In sum, this research shows that networked management is on the front line of public 
administrators and significantly shapes the concept of public administration. 
Collaborations in Thai cities reflect pleasantly the movement toward more responsive, 
and perhaps more effective, public administration. This study mirrors the increasing 
importance of bonding between governments and society and the potential benefit of 
having a good relationship. Therefore, networked management is the rule of the new 
administrative game for today’s and future’s complex public tasks. 
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NOTES 
 
                                                 
1 The law became effective two years after its enactment (or in 2001). 
2 For example, in fiscal year 2005, in case of municipalities, general-purpose transfers are simply divided 
into two parts: (i) fifty percent of all transfers will be allocated to all municipalities by the proportion of 
residential population; (ii) another fifty percent of transfer will be allocated equally to all municipalities. 
The same is also true for the transfer policies of other fiscal years. Details can be read from the Ordinance 
of National Decentralization Committee for the Allocation of Intergovernmental Transfer in Fiscal Year 
2006, Royal Gazette, Vol. 122, Special edition, November 1, 2005, pp 23. 
3 Department of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior of Thailand, as of September 30, 2007. 
4 The lower-tier governments, municipality and TAO, function as a single operating unit, which is very 
close to local residents, providing local public services within their defined territory. While municipalities 
are located in urbanized areas, TAOs are mostly established in less-developed rural communities. In 
contrast, PAO is the upper-tier local government which covers an entire province and is responsible for 
administering local public services at the provincial level as well as for working in development projects 
that need collaboration among several municipalities or TAOs within the provincial territory. In addition to 
the three general forms, there are two special units of local governments governing specific areas; namely, 
Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) and Pattaya City. More details about institutional 
arrangement and service responsibilities can be read from, for instance, Krueathep (2004), and Suwanmala 
(2007). 
5 TAO is the latest institutional development of a multi-level governance system in Thailand. It has been 
erected by the national parliamentary act in 1994 and has very limited administrative and fiscal capacities, 
compared with the other forms of local governments. In term of human resources, TAO is allowed by laws 
to have the number of permanent staff between 3 and 21, depending on the amount of own-source local 
revenues. Moreover, the average total revenue of TAO is about 3.18% and 20.98%, on average, to those of 
PAO and municipality, respectively (Ministry of Finance of Thailand, 2004 fiscal year data). 
6 This surely may cause case-selection bias. Readers should be cautious in generalizing the results from this 
study. 
7 The number does not include students in public schools administered by Ministry of Education and 
private schools. 
8 In Thailand, the government, either national or local, does not provide a universal health care coverage. In 
addition, social security fund does not cover those who work in agricultural sectors, unless they voluntarily 
apply for the fund and pay contributions at predetermined rates. 
9 This finding is surprising in that in Thailand, there is no legal constrain for local governments to 
collaborate with one another. Still, the Decentralization Plan and Process Act of 1999 substantially 
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